fbpx

Executive Protection Institute

Executive Protection Institute

The paradox of weapons

For many professionals, a firearm is a prerequisite in the practice of firearms. executive protection. Many justify this belief with the fact that most attacks against executives are carried out with firearms, from which they deduce that, likewise, these are needed to defend them. No doubt, such a conjecture might seem quite logical and reasonable if it were not for the overwhelming statistics, which indicate that, in real situations, the effectiveness of firearms in executive protection is only 5.3 %, as this study shows.

 

Firearms turn out to be very effective for attackers (as they have a 94.7 % probability of success) but quite bad for defenders, as the probability of them being useful to them is really minimal. This is due to multiple factors, which are described and detailed in the book Executive Protection in the 21st Century: The New Doctrine.

Here we only want to point out that even the most famed protection teams, such as the U.S. Secret Service and Israeli Security, succumbed to even lone aggressors, despite having a huge numerical and weapons advantage over the aggressors.

 

From this follows the "reaction equation", which refers to the fact that the capacity of an equipment to executive protection to react is directly proportional to the ineptitude of the aggressor himself, since a well-planned and surprisingly executed attack rarely leaves a space in which reaction is humanly possible. This is attested to by Olivera Ćirković, a former member of the international band Pink Panthersfamous for its surgically planned attacks on objects and people around the world. In hundreds of carefully prepared actions, the armed guards and escorts of the victims never managed to fire a single shot, instead, they ended up lying on the ground with their hands behind their heads. Olivera will tell us more about these attacks and how to prevent them at this year's EP Summit in Mexico City.

It is clear that the use of weapons in the executive protection must be subject to a prior risk study for each service, a study that will also depend on multiple factors. What we wish to emphasize is that the use of weapons is not necessarily an indispensable tool, but rather an auxiliary one; and that the operations of the executive protection should not be focused on their implementation, but rather on strategies to anticipate and avoid risks in order to save the lives of both executives and protectors.

It is clear that the use of weapons in the executive protection must be subject to a prior risk study for each service, a study that will also depend on multiple factors. What we wish to emphasize is that the use of weapons is not necessarily an indispensable tool, but rather an auxiliary one; and that the operations of the executive protection should not be focused on their implementation, but rather on strategies to anticipate and avoid risks in order to save the lives of both executives and protectors.

en_USEnglish