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Executive Protection and the Use of Firearms - A Study of a Representative Sample

Spanish, Uncategorized / By

There has been much discussion about the effectiveness of firearms in Executive Protection. For many protectors, as well as for the protected, firearms mean protection and, moreover, an indispensable requirement to be able to exercise it. That is why we set ourselves the difficult task of determining, with data and facts, how effective firearms really are in executive security in real situations.

However, this purpose is almost impossible to determine with absolute scientific rigor, since, in Mexico alone, it would be practically unfeasible to count how many people are involved in this activity, including private security elements, complementary police, police commissioned to guard people, military personnel who perform these tasks on official orders, retired military personnel who do it on their own, individuals with or without carrying a weapon who provide services without having a security company, escorts for large corporations and those who call themselves "private security guards". "driver escorts". That is to say, on principle, we do not have the precise number of the protectors; we do not know how many of them have a weapon or not, nor the number of total events in which they could have used it successfully or unsuccessfully.

We know, according to INEGI, that in the last three decades we have had a total of 2,877 executives and officials murdered, but we do not know how many of them had protectors and how many of them carried a firearm. If we extrapolate this to a worldwide scale, then it becomes impossible to make a completely accurate study.

This is the reason why we decided to take a representative sample that would allow us to obtain a result, although approximate, significant enough to determine the performance of firearms in Executive Protection. For this purpose, we analyzed 131 attacks against prominent public figures that took place during the 20th century and so far in the 21st century in 60 different countries.

What were the criteria for considering these 131 cases?  In order for the sample to be meaningful, the following aspects were taken into account:

  • Universal in nature, since the cases are worldwide.
  • Historically verifiable and widely disseminated facts.
  • The number must be sufficiently representative.
  • Covering a significant period of time.
  • It must be verifiable that the victims had an armed security team.
  • Victims who are persons of the highest or very high rank in their respective countries, or persons with official protection assigned by the authorities (In this way, it can be presumed that the elements that provided them with protection were duly selected and trained. Thus, the failures in the reaction cannot be attributed to a lack of training or aptitude, a characteristic of utmost relevance for the present analysis).

Only attacks have been taken into account, since kidnapping cases, likewise, would be impossible to quantify. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult to have historically verifiable facts about the performance of armed personnel in each case. The same applies to the use of firearms against random assaults and other similar problems, since they are even less documented.

The sample of 131 universal and verifiable cases is sufficiently broad and representative to show us what the best armed security groups, in their respective countries, were able to do in the cases of real attacks that occurred over more than a century and what relevance firearms had in protecting people in all these events.
In order to consider that in an attack the use of firearms was successful, the criterion is that they must have been used in a timely manner; that is to say, that their intervention was decisive for the unharmful outcome of the protected person, otherwise his survival could be attributed to chance and not to the effectiveness of the firearms.

The cases are divided into two parts: in the first, there are those in which the attack was not consummated for various reasons, and, in the other, there are those that had a fatal outcome.

It can be seen from the study that in only 3.82 % of the cases were firearms decisive in saving the protected persons, so that, in this particular study, it shows the very little relevance that this tool has in the protection of executives and high dignitaries.

Of course, as we could also see, the 3.82 % also means saving the life of the protected, so it should not be a disregarded percentage; however, firearms should not be considered as main tools in Executive Protection, nor should the security system of a VIP be centered on their use.

It is important to emphasize once again that only those attacks against certain types of people and with a very specific type of protectors were taken into account, without taking into account the enormous number of kidnappings that plague Latin America in particular.

Of course, this is not intended to be a definitive study, but it can give a general idea of the scope that firearms have in Executive Protection. It is also important to note that, for decades, their preponderance in this industry was based on myth, or action movies, and not on facts and hard data.

Surprisingly, in 9.16 % of the cases studied, the attacks were either foiled or the attackers were subsequently immobilized with "empty hands", either by protectors or by the people themselves. These techniques were used against lone individuals who attacked public figures from the crowd (attacks against Reagan, Yitzhak Rabin, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, etc.).

This does not necessarily mean that hand-to-hand combat techniques are more effective than weapons; they simply showed their effectiveness for a specific threat that was prevalent in the study.

The attack against the Colombian presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galán, who was assassinated despite having 18 bodyguards armed to the teeth, is also noteworthy. This fact shows that a strong operation is not necessarily an effective operation.

In conclusion, the present representative sample analysis gives an approximate value of 3.82 % for firearm effectiveness in real situations.

This means that in Executive Protection the firearm is a tool of minor importance and of little reliability, however, it should not be underestimated, since, as we have seen, in some conditions, even if they are few, it can save our lives. The important thing is to focus our operations on preventive activities that allow us to deactivate attacks before they happen and not to focus our operations on methods that historically have not yielded results.

Attempts

  1. Eduard, Prince of Wales - 1900
  2. Leopold II, King of Belgium - 1902
  3. Alfonso XIII, King of Spain - 1906
  4. Theodore Roosevelt, US Presidential Candidate - 1912
  5. Lenin - 1918 (attacker subdued using empty hands)
  6. Georges Clemenceau Prime Minister of France - 1919
  7. Benito Mussolini, Leader of Fascist Italy - April 1926 (attacker subdued with empty hands)
  8. Benito Mussolini, Leader of Fascist Italy - May 1926 (attacker subdued using empty hands)
  9. Herbert Hoover, President USA - 1928
  10. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President - 1933 (attacker subdued using empty hands)
  11. Keisuke Okada, Prime Minister of Japan - 1936
  12. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran - 1949
  13. Harry Truman, President United States - 1950 (firearms were decisive)
  14. Prince Hussein, Prince of Jordan - 1960
  15. Konrad Adenauer, German Chancellor - 1952
  16. Hendrik Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa - 1960 (attacker subdued empty-handed)
  17. Charles De Gaulle, President of France - 1961 (driving was decisive)
  18. Charles De Gaulle, President of France - 1962 (driving was decisive)
  19. Georgios Papadopoulos, President of Greece - 1968
  20. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Union - 1969
  21. George Wallace, US Presidential Candidate - 1972
  22. Anne, Princess of England - 1974.
  23. Sukarno, President of Indonesia - 1962
  24. Gerald Ford, President of the United States - 1975 (attacker subdued with empty hands)
  25. Elizabeth II, Queen of England - 1981
  26. Pope John Paul II - 1981 (attacker subdued empty-handed)
  27. Reagan, President of the United States - 1981 (attacker subdued using empty hands)
  28. Chun Doo Hwan, President South Korea - 1983
  29. Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister - 1984
  30. Augusto Pinochet, President of Chile - 1986 (firearms were decisive)
  31. Wonfgang Schäuble, German Minister of the Interior - 1990 (subdued attacker using empty hands)
  32. John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom - 1991 (armored windows were decisive)
  33. Eduard Shevarnadze, President of Georgia - 1992
  34. Eduard Shevarnadze, President of Georgia - 1995
  35. Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt - 1995 (firearms were decisive)
  36. Kiro Gligorov, President of Macedonia - 1995
  37. José María Aznar, Spanish politician and former Prime Minister - 1995 (armored vehicle and the failures of the attackers were decisive)
  38. Prince Charles of Wales 1995
  39. Eduard Shevarnadze, President of Georgia - 1998 (Armored vehicle was decisive)
  40. Jacques Chirac, President of France, 2002 (attacker subdued empty-handed)
  41. Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan - 2002 (firearms were decisive)
  42. Pervez Musharaf, President of Pakistan - 2003
  43. Murat Zyazikov, President of Ingushetia - 2004
  44. Shaukat Aziz, Prime Minister of Pakistan - 2004
  45. Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister Bangladesh - 2004
  46. Ibrahim Rugova, President of Kosovo - 2005
  47. Pervez Musharaf, President of Pakistan - 2007
  48. George W. Bush, President of the United States and Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia - 2005
  49. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, President of Somalia - 2006
  50. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, Secretary of Defense of Sri Lanka - 2006
  51. Dick Cheney, Vice President of the United States - 2007
  52. Guillaume Soro, Premier of Ivory Coast - 2007
  53. Abdul Gayoom, President Maldives - 2008 (attacker subdued using empty hands)
  54. Jose Ramos Horta, President of East Timor - 2008
  55. Queen Beatrix, Queen of Netherlands - 2009
  56. Yunus- Bek Yevkurov, Leader of Ingushetia - 2009
  57. Stephen Timms, British Labor MP - 2010
  58. Ali Abdulah Saleh, President of Yemen - 2011
  59. Apha Condé, President of Guinea, (firearms were decisive)
  60. Abdul Ghafoor Haideri, Leader of the Pakistani Senate - 2017.
  61. Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela - 2018
  62. Omar Garcia Harfuch Chief of Mexico City Police 2020
  63. Ivan Duque, President of Colombia- 2021
  64. Assimi Goita, President of Mali - 2021 (attacker subdued empty-handed)
  65. Aleksandar Vučić President of Serbia 2022.
  66. Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner vice-president of Argentina
  67. Manuel Macron, President of France 2023 (attacker subdued with empty hands)
  68. Fumio Kishida , Prime Minister of Japan ( attacker subdued empty-handed )

Consummated facts:

      1. William McKinley, President of the United States - 1901
      2. Franz Ferdinand (Franz Ferdinand), Archduke of Austria - 1914
      3. Sidonio Pais, President Portugal - 1918
      4. Michael Collins, Irish revolutionary leader - 1922.
      5. Ahmet Muhtar Zogolli -1924
      6. Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia - 1939
      7. Walter Edward Guinness, Lord Moyne, UK Minister to the Middle East - 1944
      8. Ahmad Mahar Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt - 1945
      9. Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi, Prime Minister of Egypt - 1948
      10. Abdullah I, King of Jordan - 1951
      11. José Antonio Remón Cantera, President of Panama - 1955
      12. Hendrik Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa - 1960
      13. Hazza al Majali, Prime Minister of Jordan 1960
      14. Louis Rwagasore,Prime Minister of Burundi, 1961
      15. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States - 1963
      16. Jospeh Bamina, Prime Minister of Burundi, 1965
      17. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, President South Africa, 1966
      18. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States -1968
      19. Marthin Luther King, African-American activist-1968
      20. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, President of Somalia, 1969 
      21. Wasfi al-Tal, Prime Minister of Jordan - 1971
      22. Abdul Rahman, Inspector General of Police Malaysia - 1974
      23. Francois Tombalbaye, President of Chad,1975
      24. Shaik Mujibur Rajman, President of Bangladesh,1975
      25. Muetala Muhammed, Head of State of Nigeria,1976
      26. Hans Martin Schleyer, German business leader - 1977
      27. MarkenNgouabi, President of Congo,1977
      28. Ahmad bin Hussein al-Ghashmi, President of the Republic of Yemen - 1978
      29. Aldo Moro former Prime Minister of Italy -1978 
      30. Park Chung Hee, President of South Korea - 1979
      31. Lord Louis Mountbatten, diplomat, officer of the British Royal Navy - 1979
      32. William Richard Tolbert, President of Liberia, 1980
      33. Anwar el Sadat, Prime Minister of Egypt - 1981.
      34. Ziaur Rahman, President of Bangladesh ,1981
      35. Bachir Gemayel, President Elect of Lebanon, 1982
      36. Mohammad Ali Rajai, President of Iran, 1981
      37. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India - 1984
      38. Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, Minister of Justice of Colombia - 1984
      39. Thimas Sankara, President of Burkina Faso, 1987
      40. Carlos Mauro Hoyos, Attorney General of Colombia - 1988
      41. Luis Carlos Galan, Colombian Presidential Candidate - 1989
      42. James N Rowe, US Military Advisor - 1989
      43. Waldemar Franklin Quintero, Antioquia Police Commander, Colombia - 1989
      44. Alfred Herrhausen, CEO Deuche Bank - 1989
      45. Samuel Doe, President Liberia - 1990
      46. Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, Presidential candidate, leader of the Patriotic Union party - 1990
      47. Rajiv Gandhi, Hindu politician - 1991
      48. Giovanni Falcone, Anti-Mafia Judge - 1992
      49. Melchoir Ndadaye, President of Burundi 1993
      50. Luis Donaldo Colosio, Presidential Candidate Mexico -1994.
      51. Juvénal Habyarimana, President of Rwanda - 1994
      52. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel - 1995
      53. Vazgen Sargsyan, Prime Minister of Armenia - 1999
      54. Luis María Argaña, vice president of Paraguay - 1999
      55. Zoran Djindjic, Prime Minister of Serbia - 2003
      56. João Bernardo Vieira, President of Guinea 2009
      57. Benazir Bhutto former Prime Minister of Pakistan
      58. Ali Abdulah Saleh, President of Yemen - 2017.
      59. Alexander Zakharchenko, President Republic of Donetsk - 2018
      60. Aristóteles Sandoval, former Governor of the State of Jalisco - 2020
      61. Jovenel Moise, President of Haiti- 2021
      62. Shinzo Abe former Prime Minister of Japan 2022
      63. Atiq Ahmed former Prime Minister of India- 2023
      64. Fernando Villavicencio Presidential Candidate Ecuador 2023

Thwarted assault on Chilean foreign minister: A contrast between police mentality and executive security

Spanish / By

 

The Chilean Chancellor, Alberto van Klaveren, suffered an attempted assault on his car around midnight on Saturday, September 9, from which he escaped unharmed. The incident occurred in the vicinity of his home, at the time of his arrival, while he was in the company of his driver and a police escort. Two attackers got out of a vehicle, one of them threatening with a firearm, at which point the female escort pulled out her weapon and opened fire. According to CNN Chile, the attackers did not fire, while other news sources indicate that the police fired 13 shots, slightly wounding one of the attackers in the shoulder, thus thwarting the assault. The criminals had three other accomplices who did not actively participate in the crime.

Evidently, the policewoman's performance was effective, as both the chancellor and herself were unharmed and the robbery was foiled. She acted in accordance with her education and training, with good results.

However, it is important to note that both the performance and the operational structure were designed from the point of view of law enforcement and not Executive Protection. We often hear news stories of how a police officer thwarted an assault on a business, bank or bystander. But the work method focused on thwarting an ongoing attack should not be applied in executive protection, as it requires that the executive is already under attack, and that is precisely what we seek to avoid in our profession.

There is no doubt that, by repelling the attack by firing his weapon, the stakes were raised, since the risk of losing a material asset became the risk of being involved in a crossfire and endangering the life of the Chancellor. In the last six years, in Mexico, where this crime is much more frequent than in Chile, three protégés lost their lives in crossfire when their bodyguards tried to defend them from similar assaults. In the same period, three bodyguards were killed and four were wounded in the same circumstances.

When executive protection becomes lethal: The case of businessman David Gonzalez and the need to reformulate protection services.


By repelling the assault in this circumstance, the protector inevitably involves his protégé in a Russian roulette with great possibilities of losing his life, since, no matter how skilled the protector may be, there are always a number of factors beyond his control.

The focus of Executive Protection is to prevent an attack, not to wait to react, which has been the working philosophy of many members of the police or military assigned to this activity without specialized training.


It is evident that, if we analyze the case, our brave companion had no tools to prevent the attack. The vehicle was not armored, there was no early warning (which would have easily detected five people near the "seam" in advance), no protective logistics were implemented to reduce exposure, among other aspects.

(You can learn more about early warning in this video:

Fortunately, on this occasion, their action was successful. However, using police officers as escorts without specialized training in executive protection proves fatal against serious aggressors as demonstrated by the recent unfortunate assassination of Ecuador's presidential candidate, Fernando Villavicencio. Executive protection is a sui generis profession with its own methodology, approach and tools that should not be confused with other branches of security despite having similarities. Only in this way can we make this profession safer for both the protected and the protectors.

The murder of the mayor of Manta: A call to strengthen counter-surveillance

Spanish / By

We have insisted on multiple occasions that counter-surveillance is the most effective measure to prevent all types of attacks against executives and people with high critical impact. Furthermore, we have emphasized that this measure is widely unknown and underutilized, which represents a serious strategic error and facilitates the work of criminals.

The Power of Counter-Surveillance: What Criminals Fear More Than Guns

In cases such as the attack against Norberto Rivera in 2018, the Secretary of Citizen Security, Omar García Harfuch, in 2020, businessman Eduardo Beaven in 2021 and Gabriela Sanches and Ciro Gómez Leyva in 2022 (all in Mexico), subsequent investigations revealed that the victims had been under hostile surveillance for months prior to the attack, without being detected in time.

Another unfortunate example occurred recently on July 23 in Ecuador, when the popular mayor of Manta, Agustín Intriago, was assassinated during a public event in the neighborhood of 15 de Septiembre in Manta, Manabí province.

Weeks later, the Ecuadorian police revealed that the victim had been followed for several days by a blue van posing as a vendor of water in jerry cans.

This vehicle followed the mayor everywhere, until the last day he was killed, constantly providing information and guiding the assassin.

This tragic incident once again reinforces the need to focus our efforts on counter-surveillance, rather than reacting only to attacks. Attackers must watch and analyze their victim for an extended period of time before acting, which provides a perfect opportunity to detect them and thwart the attack before it occurs.

If there had been a counter-surveillance team, it would have been easy to detect a van of alleged water vendors that moved practically every day near the mayor. This shows us in a real situation how simple and effective counter-surveillance would have been in saving lives. It is imperative to shift the focus of the operation to counter-surveillance and early warning, as protection based on reaction alone is fatal.

Eight Lessons Learned from the Assassination of Fernando Villavicencio-

English / By

The untimely demise of Fernando Villavicencio, a respected presidential candidate in Ecuador, occurred on a somber Wednesday, August 9th at 6:20 PM local time. This tragic event unfolded in the aftermath of a bustling campaign event at the Anderson School in Quito.

In the moments preceding his departure, Villavicencio, a 59-year-old accomplished journalist, was ensnared in a deadly ambush. Amidst a protective cordon of National Police agents, he succumbed to a relentless barrage of gunfire, with at least 40 bullets being fired in his direction. His guardians stood helpless against the onslaught, unable to protect him from the calamity. This incident underscores the pressing need to revisit and revise the paradigm and practice of Executive Protection on a global scale.

 

While the scarcity of details hinders an exhaustive analysis, we can glean eight vital lessons from this sorrowful occurrence:

1. An operation based only on armed companions waiting to react is fatal.

2. Law enforcement officers are ill-suited for executive protection duties unless they've undergone precise Executive Protection (EP) training. Policing or military work and executive protection are distinct professions, and while some skills may be useful in both, Executive Protection is a unique profession with its own methodology and doctrine that requires highly specialized training. Including police officers in this operation without proper training was a dangerous improvisation.

3. Firearms, while potent offensive tools, falter in their effectiveness for defensive purposes in Executive Protection. The assertion that firearms, being the weapon of choice in many attacks, are indispensable for defense is debunked by empirical evidence, as illustrated by this assassination. A comprehensive study of 132 attacks on eminent public figures across over 60 countries in the past 123 years reveals a mere 3.79% effectiveness of firearms in executive defense scenarios.

Source: https://ivanivanovich.com/armas-de-fuego-en-la-proteccion-ejecutiva/

4. The most vulnerable points, or "seams", in executive protection operations demand meticulous planning and execution. "Seams" refer to the instances when an individual is highly susceptible to risk, typically when alighting from or approaching a vehicle. These moments host the majority of attacks.

5. Armored vehicles are essential for reducing risks to executives. These units mitigate risks during travel and can provide shelter and evacuation in critical moments. One of the key factors that saved President Reagan's life during the 1980 assassination attempt was the presence of an armored vehicle.

6. Identifying the criminal groups that pose threats to the executive (as was the case here) necessitates intelligence gathering. This proactive approach could potentially have averted the fatal attack, proving more beneficial than relying only on firearms.

7. An unconventional threat cannot be fought with conventional means. The attackers blended into the crowd, while the protectors were easily identifiable even with police uniforms, making them easy targets. In public events, the deployment of shadow agents within the crowd is essential to reduce risks.


8. The concept of close protection is ineffective and dangerous. In most cases, when the crucial moment arrives to protect and react at close range, everything is lost. Counter-surveillance should have been implemented to detect hostile activities in advance, and the potential aggressors' locations around the "seams" should have been defined to monitor these areas beforehand, alerting and surprising the attackers, instead of relying solely on the reaction that, as almost always, proved ineffective. Therefore, it is crucial to shift the concept of close protection towards an anticipatory approach.

The traditional executive protection is effective mostly if nothing happens, but it crumbles like a house of cards in any real situation. Therefore, it is crucial to change the way we conceive and operate our profession to make it safer for both the protected and the protectors.

Eight lessons learned from the murder of Fernando Villavicencio

Spanish / By

Fernando Villavicencio, a presidential hopeful in Ecuador, met his tragic end on Wednesday, August 9 at 6:20 p.m. local time, following a campaign rally held at the Anderson School in Quito.

Immediately before boarding his vehicle, flanked by National Police escorts, Villavicencio, a 59-year-old journalist, was mortally wounded by gunfire. His assailants unleashed a hail of at least 40 bullets, and his protectors had no chance to save him. This event reiterates the urgency of addressing the conceptual and operational crisis affecting Executive Protection worldwide.

Despite the lack of information for a complete analysis, we can draw at least eight lessons from this tragic incident:

1. An operation based on armed escorts waiting to react is fatal.

2. Police officers are not suited to provide executive protection unless they have received specialized training. Police or military work and executive protection are distinct professions, and while some skills may be useful in both, Executive Protection is a unique profession with its own methodology and doctrine that requires highly specialized training. Including police officers in this operation without proper training was a dangerous improvisation.

3. Guns are very effective for attacking an executive, but virtually ineffective for defense. Although it is argued that since firearms are used in almost every attack, they are indispensable for defense, the facts do not support this claim, as demonstrated once again in this attack. Moreover, in a study of 132 attacks on prominent public figures in more than 60 countries over the past 123 years, firearms were only effective in defending executives in 3.79% of the cases. https://ivanivanovich.com/armas-de-fuego-en-la-proteccion-ejecutiva/ 

4. "Seams" remain the most critical points in an executive protection operation and must be planned and performed with the utmost attention. The seams are the times when a person is most exposed to a high-risk environment, usually when exiting or before entering a vehicle. These are the scenarios where the vast majority of attacks occur. We have analyzed it in more detail in this video:

5. Armored vehicles are essential to reduce risks to executives. These units reduce risks in transfers and can provide shelter and evacuation at critical moments. One of the key factors that saved President Reagan's life during the 1980 assassination attempt was the presence of an armored vehicle.

6. If groups that endanger the executive are identified (as was the case), intelligence on these groups is critical to prevent the attack. This measure, and not the weapons, could have saved the candidate's life.

7. You cannot fight an unconventional threat with conventional means. The attackers were camouflaged in the crowd, while the protectors were easily identifiable even in police uniforms, making them easy targets. In public events the application of shadow agents within the crowd is essential to reduce risks as I explained in this video:

8. The concept of close protection is ineffective and dangerous, because when it comes time to protect up close, all is lost. Counter-surveillance should have been implemented to detect hostile activities in advance and the locations from where potential aggressors would act around the "seams" should have been defined to monitor these areas in advance, alert and surprise the aggressors - instead of just relying on reaction which proved, as almost always - ineffective. This is why it is urgent to change the concept of close protection to anticipatory protection.

The executive protection we see in the movies is effective only if nothing happens, but it collapses like a house of cards in any real situation. Therefore, it is critical to change the way we conceive and operate our profession to make it safer for both protectees and protectors.

The risks of unconditional obedience in Executive Protection: the dangerous 'Yes Pattern'.

Spanish / By

Executive Protection is probably the only profession based on habits and customs, improvisations, cognitive biases and very few serious studies and research. The profession was able to function this way for decades in many countries, since nothing happened and the inefficiency and danger of this pseudo methodology was not seen. Unfortunately, Mexico is no longer one of these countries and in the last year alone, 9 executives and 15 of their escorts were murdered here.

One of the concepts contributing to this disastrous outcome is undoubtedly
the "Si Patron". In this concept, the escorts basically follow the executive, do what he or she tells them to do, without having any influence over the attitudes and/or activity of the protégé, some of whom exponentially raise their risks making it impossible to protect them. As demonstrated by the aforementioned 24 unfortunate deaths in Mexico in the last year.

The deadly "Yes Pattern" methodology is based on three premises that are wholly or partially fallacious:

1. We are hired to make the executive's life easier.
2. He who pays the piper calls the tune. The executive will not accept suggestions, since he pays and what he wants is done.
3. We cannot change the executive's lifestyle.

These arguments would seem convincing if it were not for the disastrous results of their application. But let us analyze:

1. We are not hired to make executives' lives easier, but to manage and reduce their risks. While it is true that many of our activities as a "by product" make the executive's life easier, this is not our main objective. We are hired because a security study showed that the executive is vulnerable to certain risks, which he himself understands and accepts, and we are implementing the necessary measures to mitigate them. Otherwise, we would be called "executive hostesses" and not executive protection. However, it is true that many executive comfort activities that we can perform help reduce risks as we explain in this video:

but there are also many other activities of the same nature that can increase risks if carried out indiscriminately.

2. In executive protection, "he who pays the piper calls the tune" does not apply. Our profession is the activity where lives depend on the protectors in the same way that the lives of the passengers depend on the pilot of an airplane, and no passenger gives orders to the pilot on how to steer the aircraft, even though they paid for the ticket, or even if it were the owner of the airline himself.

3. No one is trying to change the lifestyle of executives, only to make the necessary logistical adjustments to manage their risks. These are two very different things. Here are some examples: businessman Adolfo Lagos was murdered in 2017 when his escorts were trying to defend him from an assault while riding his bicycle on a route with high rates of this crime. Changing his lifestyle would be to have told him to stop cycling. Suggesting a route with lower crime rates would be a logistical adjustment that reduces the risks only without affecting the lifestyle itself. Businessman Martin Rodriguez was murdered in 2021 as he left the gym. Changing the lifestyle would be to have told him to stop going to the gym. Suggesting other facilities that do not involve as much "sewing" would be a logistical adjustment only. (Of course, apparently in the latter case many other things would be required).

The list of unfortunate deaths caused in whole or in part by the "Si Patron" concept is very long. This is why modern Executive Protection starts with establishing the client's own collaboration. Of course, this requires a new set of skills which are communication, negotiation and persuasion of the user, something very different from the reactive skills traditionally associated with our profession.

Executives, for the most part, are intelligent and capable people who understand the reasons and well-founded concepts. This is a process of negotiation and acceptance by conviction, not imposition. At least, these are our experiences of operating with executives in LATAM for almost 30 years. Of course, there will always be colleagues who can't, don't know, don't want to or simply are not interested in this type of work. However, from what we have seen in Mexico in the last year alone, achieving collaboration with the executive has no alternative to save lives, both of the protected and the protectors.

Attack on Concordia Mayor: Improvisation in Executive Protection claims the lives of three protectors

Spanish / By

On Friday, June 9, three bodyguards of the mayor of La Concordia, Chiapas, Miguel Ángel Córdova Ochoa, were killed when an armed group attacked their vehicle in the city of Tuxtla Gutiérrez.

When these types of unfortunate incidents occur, the information received in the media is usually not very reliable, as they replicate the first versions of the facts without doing a proper investigation, which can result in misinformation. Most of the newspapers handled the story that the mayor was traveling in the vehicle at the time of the attack and that he managed to get out and take shelter unharmed in the school, all this under fire that killed three of his protectors, which is implausible. What actually happened is that the mayor had already arrived at the school and was inside the school when his Suburban van was attacked.

Although there are still many unknowns surrounding the case, some conclusions are evident:

- The implementation of armored vehicles is essential to significantly reduce risks in this type of operational circumstances.
- Basing executive protection solely on the deployment of armed escorts is deadly.
- Fence protection alone is totally ineffective.
- Counter surveillance and early warning are essential to reduce risks and save lives.

In the last 10 months, 11 protectors have lost their lives in Mexico in improvised operations based on close protection and the use of armed escorts that have historically proven ineffective. Only a change in operational approach that prioritizes intelligence and anticipatory protection can make this profession safer for both protectees and protectors.

Protection Team Failure Puts German Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Risk

English / By

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has joined the list of world leaders who have experienced failures in their personal protection. This incident, which occurred recently at Frankfurt Airport, has highlighted the vulnerability of world leaders in an increasingly dangerous world. Emmanuel Macron, Iván Duque, Gabriel Boric, King Charles III of England, and many other leaders have experienced similar attacks, demonstrating that the concept of traditional executive protection is outdated and ineffective today.

In the case of Olaf Scholz, an unknown driver joined the convoy of the German chancellor without being detected. The driver managed to reach the runway where Scholz's aircraft was located and hugged Scholz without his protection agents being able to intervene in time.

It is concerning that despite the large number of vehicles and motorcycles in the chancellor's convoy, no one noticed the presence of the unregistered vehicle. This demonstrates that a large protection force is not necessarily effective. Instead, smaller, well-communicated groups operating in different circles in the depth of the operational zone can be more effective in detecting anomalies in advance and alerting promptly.

The ineffectiveness of the cumbersome and outdated convoys, these "operational dinosaurs" from the 1960s, has been demonstrated in numerous attacks in recent decades, and this incident at Frankfurt Airport is further evidence of their limitations if other operational elements are not available.

In addition, counter-surveillance operatives were absent in this case, as if there had been a counter-surveillance team, the intruder would have been immediately identified. Finally, it would be redundant to comment on the last-minute reaction failure of the close protection team, since, as statistics show, these groups historically fail practically every time they are tested.

It is important to note that the chancellor's protection team must be careful not to consider this incident as a "tune-up" for them, as a similar incident occurred a few months before the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic.

In summary, the security failure at Frankfurt Airport involving German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is a sign that the current executive protection system is outdated and needs to be modernized and improved. Diamond formations, weapons, and cumbersome convoys no longer deter attackers. A radical change in understanding and practicing executive protection is required to reduce risks and save the lives of both protectors and protected individuals.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz at risk: personal protection failure

Spanish / By

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has joined the list of world leaders who have suffered personal protection breaches. This incident, which occurred recently at Frankfurt airport, has highlighted the vulnerability of world leaders in an increasingly dangerous world. Emmanuel Macron, Ivan Duque, Gabriel Boric, King Charles III of England and many other leaders have experienced similar attacks, demonstrating that the concept of traditional executive protection is outdated and ineffective today.

In the case of Olaf Scholz, an unknown driver joined the German Chancellor's convoy undetected. The driver managed to reach the runway where the chancellor's aircraft was located and embraced Scholz without his protection agents being able to intervene in time.

It is worrying that despite the large number of vehicles and motorcycles in the Chancellor's convoy, no one noticed the presence of the unregistered vehicle. This demonstrates that large protection is not necessarily effective. Instead, smaller, well-communicated groups operating in different circles deep in the operational area may be more effective in detecting anomalies early and providing timely warning.

The ineffectiveness of the obsolete and obsolete convoys, these "operational dinosaurs" of the 1960s, has been demonstrated in numerous attacks in recent decades, and this incident at Frankfurt airport is further proof of their limitations in the absence of other operational elements.

In addition, counter-surveillance operations were conspicuous by their absence in this case, since if there had been a counter-surveillance team, the intruder would have been identified immediately. Finally, it would be redundant to comment on the last minute reaction failure of the close protection team, since, as statistics show, these groups historically fail virtually every time they are put to the test.

It is important to note that the chancellor's protection team should be careful not to consider this incident as a "tune-up" for them, as a similar incident occurred a few months before the attack on Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic.

In short, the security breach at Frankfurt airport involving German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is a sign that the current executive protection system is obsolete and needs to be modernized and improved. Diamond formations, guns and gaudy convoys no longer deter attackers. A radical change in the way executive protection is understood and practiced is required to reduce risks and save lives of both protectees and protectors.

The Power of Counter-Surveillance: What Criminals Fear More Than Guns

Spanish / By

Counter-surveillance is undoubtedly one of the most effective and least employed methods in executive protection. Despite being a technique that has been widely known for a long time, its potential is practically untapped in executive protection operations.

Recent regrettable attacks in Mexico City support this point of view. In attacks such as the one on Norberto Rivera's house in 2018, the attack against the Secretary of Citizen Security, Omar García Harfuch, in 2020; restaurant businessman Eduardo Beaven in 2021 and Gabriela Sanches and Ciro Gómez Leyva in 2022; subsequent investigations evidenced that the victims had been subject to hostile surveillance by criminals for months prior to the aggression, without being detected in time.

 

An attack on an executive is known to last only a few moments, but the preparation for such an attack involves a prolonged process of observation and monitoring of the target by the criminals, which can last for months. Counter-surveillance makes it possible to detect and thwart the attack in this early observation phase, thus avoiding exposing the protégé to risks and uncertainties associated with the reaction.

The effectiveness of counter-surveillance is widely recognized, even by the criminals themselves. Olivera Ćirković, a former member of the famous international Pink Panthers gang, maintains that she never felt deterred by armed agents. However, if during pre-surveillance of a victim someone approached and took note of her vehicle license plate, or identified her and asked what she was doing there, she would immediately abandon that victim....

According to his own words, the most critical phase of an attack, from his perspective as a criminal, was not the moment of the aggression itself, since, by then, the victim had been studied exhaustively, being distracted and at his point of maximum vulnerability. On the other hand, the aggressors attacked with the surprise factor, hiding their identity with balaclavas, using stolen vehicles and counting on other advantages in their favor.

For this reason, Olivera notes that the most critical aspect for her was not the final assault, but the prolonged process of observing and analyzing the victim. During this time, she could not wear a disguise, as it would attract attention, and the vehicles she used had to be legal, which made them identifiable. Her greatest fear was to be observed and identified by someone unknown to her, whom she could not see or know of her existence. In fact, this is how she eventually ended up being arrested. As a result, it is clear that high-profile criminals fear counter-surveillance far more than they fear guns.

If there had been a structured counter-surveillance system in the previously mentioned cases, the experts in this technique would have identified the presence of the criminals in the same way as it was done later, and even more easily, since they would have had teams in the field. In this way, the attack would have been neutralized months before its execution, thus avoiding human losses.

The question we must ask ourselves is: what else must happen for us to leave behind dangerous fantasies about weapons and reaction, and orient our actions in executive protection towards methods of counter-surveillance and early warning, thus avoiding the loss of life of both protectees and their protectors?

Russian Roulette of Executive Protection Reaction: Reflections on the Tragic Loss of an Escort in Uruapan

Spanish / By

On the night of April 21, 2023, in Uruapan, Michoacán, a shooting took the life of an escort while defending his executive from a criminal who tried to take his vehicle.

In the last two years in Mexico alone, there have been two escorts killed, one executive killed and four escorts injured due to the reckless adoption of tactics involving armed agents in unarmored vehicles. This approach increases rather than mitigates risk, as the risk of loss of a watch or vehicle (insured) becomes the risk of loss of life for both the executive and his protector. I have discussed this issue at length in a previous article:

Never request armed drivers in unarmored vehicles, please.

Last week, an executive lost his life in a coffee shop in Tulum, Mexico, during a shootout that erupted when they tried to defend him with firearms against an attempted robbery of his watch. Today, the watch and vehicle are still intact, but an escort and a protégé have died in two separate incidents involving similar situations: confronting robberies with firearms while the executive is present.

In all these cases, the protectors acted courageously and decisively, following their training and beliefs. The responsibility does not lie with them, but with those who hire, train and send them to work without providing them with a comprehensive understanding of the profession and the necessary tools to do their job effectively. It is more than proven that the use of firearms alone is not only insufficient, but detrimental in some situations. Clients should not expect to save money by hiring armed escorts in order not to invest in armored vehicles, as this apparent saving may prove to be tragic. Firearms and armored vehicles are two different tools used for different purposes and one cannot be used to substitute or save the other.

Furthermore, it is irrational and inhumane for the client to see it as acceptable to risk his life and the life of his protector for the value of a watch or the deductible of an insured vehicle, when facing a robbery with firearms.

To preserve lives in the field of executive protection, it is essential that both protectees and protectors acquire solid knowledge in what we call the Compass of Executive Protection. The four cardinal points of this compass are: Intelligence, Counter-Surveillance, Protective Logistics and Early Warning; and at its core is collaboration with the executive, achieved through our communication and persuasion skills. Only then will this profession be safer for both protectees and protectors.

aivalogo

Executive Protection Institute

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