If someone tried to sell two tires and a steering wheel as if it were a complete vehicle, he would surely become an object of ridicule, since no one in his right mind would be willing to pay the full price of a car only for some of its parts, no matter how important they may be, since, on their own, they do not fulfill the function of moving people from one point to another, as a complete car would.
However, this is precisely what happens very often in the executive protection (CIRM), The company offers only some parts of the protection system, very important parts, no doubt, but which alone do not reduce the risks for the executives who contract them without knowing their true scope.
Measures that do not (or do not significantly) reduce risks on their own are:
According to studies, their range in real conditions is slightly greater than 4 %, which may indeed save a life, but it is too little to lower the risks to an optimal level. In turn, under certain conditions and in certain areas of operation, firearms can raise risks rather than lower them. Many consider their main advantage to be deterrence, and this is true in the case of small-time criminals, but not in the case of well-organized criminal groups. The firearm can significantly reduce risks in conjunction with other measures, but not on its own.
- A single driver, sometimes misnamed "escort driver".
A single driver, whether armed or unarmed, and even with proper training, cannot significantly reduce the risks, as he alone cannot effectively manage the "seams". This was sadly proven by the January 2021 murder of Mexican businessman Martin Rodriguez in Mexico City.
- Control center, GPS, panic button, reaction equipment.
There is no doubt that a control and monitoring center is absolutely necessary and represents the basis for any operation of executive protectionbut, by itself, it does not reduce risks. In the case of an attack, it will give us precise information on where and at what time it occurred and much more invaluable information to later investigate and, eventually, in the case of a kidnapping, find the whereabouts of the executive, or apprehend the criminals, but its isolated use does not prevent the executive from being attacked.
This center is usually always connected to the authorities and/or has its own team to react in the event of an emergency. All of this is very useful, but its use alone does not help to prevent or reduce the risk of an attack occurring. If we take as an example the attack against the Secretary of Citizen Security, Omar Garcia Harfuch, who had all the police of the city under his command, and who arrived very quickly, we realize that all this was not enough to prevent the secretary from being seriously injured and two bodyguards and a passerby from being killed. If this happened with the top police commander, we can't expect much from a particular reaction team, no matter how good it is. The attack lasts only a few moments, while the reaction team may take several minutes to move, depending on the case. This may be very useful when it comes to assisting the executive in changing a tire (which is not a minor case) or something similar, but not to reduce the risks of an attack, robbery or kidnapping.
Measures that do reduce risks:
It provides information on high impact crimes that may affect the executive, pointing out the places and times when they are most frequent in the areas of operation. This makes it possible to avoid high-risk locations and times and to implement additional measures to reduce exposure and vulnerability. If the control center is fed with this information, the risks of different crimes can be reduced.
The attack on an executive lasts only a few moments, but its preparation implies both a prolonged observation and monitoring of the victim that can last for months, as we saw in the attacks against Norberto Ribera, Omar García Harfuch and the most recent one against the restaurant businessman Eduardo Beaven. Counter-surveillance detects and deactivates the attack in this early observation phase without exposing the protected person to the risks and uncertainty involved in the reaction.
As proof of this, the words of Olivera Ćirković, former leader of the famous international band, are quoted. Pink PanthersIf during the process of observing and studying the victim we were approached by a security agent who asked us what we were doing there, or if he took our license plates, we immediately abandoned this objective.
Olivera was tried for being the organizer of the criminal group that committed 116 spectacular attacks against facilities and people in 35 countries.
- Intervention and early warning.
Early warning operations detect the points where the attackers are located minutes before the attack and intervene in advance by discovering them in their waiting phase, thus alerting the protection team and preventing the executive from entering the trap.
- Armored vehicles.
Depending on the case and the need, armored vehicles with a properly trained driver significantly reduce the risks during transfers.
From this brief analysis we can see that the most "popular", best-selling measures, such as the gun, the "driver escort", GPS and the reaction group do not reduce risks, while counter-surveillance, early warning and other measures that actually reduce risks are not used or have a minimal share of the market for the executive protection.
Only a combination of all the previously mentioned measures, and also in accordance with a safety study duly developed for each case, can bring the risks to an optimal level to make the executive protection a safer profession for all.