The U.S. Secret Service seems to be learning quickly from its mistakes. On Sunday, September 15, another "assassination attempt" was made against former President Donald Trump, the second in just two months, this time at his golf club in West Palm Beach, Florida.
At the time of the incident, Trump was enjoying a day of golf, away from his election campaign. While previewing the hole that the former president would later approach, one of his Secret Service agents noticed the barrel of a rifle sticking out of the bushes surrounding the course.
Upon realizing this, as reported by the FBI, the agents fired at least four rounds of ammunition, while the suspect, apparently wounded, fled in a vehicle.
At the time, the former president was "one or two holes" behind the attacker's location. The sheriff explained that the distance was "probably between 300 and 450 meters". It is evident that the attacker was waiting for Trump to approach the next hole to launch his attack from a shorter distance. Thanks to this Early Warning action the Secret Service agents detected and defused the attack before the protégé was in danger, acting early and surprising the attacker rather than being surprised.
The most serious errors of the Secret Service during the July 13 attack were the failure in counter-surveillance - the aggressor had been watching the place for ten days without being detected - and the lack of Early Warning, since they did not intervene in advance the positions where the aggressor was positioned and waiting to attack. The counter-surveillance is related to the "Long Time Ring", which allows stopping an attack days or months in advance, while the Early Warning corresponds to the "Medium Time Ring", which prevents attacks hours or minutes before they occur.
On this occasion, counter-surveillance failed again; the attacker had probably been observing the site several days before the attack without being detected. This prior analysis allowed him to identify opportunities and potential security breaches, getting close enough to execute an effective attack.
However, Early Warning worked very well this time. The agent intervened early in the area the protégé was about to enter, identifying critical points and defusing the attack before it posed a danger to the protégé. What is critical here is not the agent's marksmanship or the fact that the aggressor initially managed to escape, but that the attack was thwarted before the protégé was at risk. This reinforces the idea that an aggressor discovered before attacking will only seek to escape.
Unlike in Latin America, where the same mistakes are foolishly repeated and lives are lost, the Secret Service has shown that it has learned from its failures. Although it still has weaknesses in counter-surveillance, they have understood the most important lesson: the only sure way to stop an attack is to intervene in the preparation phases. They have realized that focusing on reaction is a disastrous approach. Hopefully, from this example, protectors in Latin America and elsewhere in the world will also learn this valuable lesson, making executive protection a safer profession for both protectees and protectors.
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