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3. The attack occurred again in a "seam", which highlights the importance of analyzing and strengthening these key points in the operational work. This highlights the importance of analyzing and strengthening these key points in operational work.

4. The joint arrival of the protector and protégé on the scene proves useless, since at that moment not much can be done. This was even more clearly evidenced in the attack against Carlos Bildmart. It is vital that protectors be at critical locations and times well in advance of the protégé's arrival. Even if the assassins were perfectly camouflaged, the early presence of the "shadow agents" could have detected the logistical deployment of the attackers, which involved more vehicles and, according to newspaper reports, more heavily armed criminals in one of the vans.

The murder of Carlos Bildmart: guns are not the solution.

This tragic murder adds to a disturbing statistic in Mexico, where in the last 14 months, 13 protégés and 29 of their escorts have been murdered. This fact highlights the false sense of security that can come from having only armed escorts. Even ten protectors armed with long weapons could not prevent the ambush that took the life of the Secretary of Public Security of Coyuca de Benítez, Alfredo Alonso López.

It is clear that executive protection cannot be based solely on the presence of armed escorts. The numbers mentioned above demonstrate that this strategy is not only ineffective, but can also generate a false sense of security. It is necessary to adopt a comprehensive approach that includes a proper threat assessment and the implementation of multiple measures that reduce the protégé's exposure to risk and defuse attacks before they get close to the client in terms of time and space.

So how much of the budget is allocated to measures, tools and training focused on preventing these events from occurring?

The answer is nothing or almost nothing, and this explains the tragic results mentioned at the beginning of the article. Moreover, in all the attacks that have occurred in the last five years in Latin America, from the attacks against Norberto Ribera and Omar García Harfuch in Mexico to the assassinations of Fernando Villavicencio and Agustín Intriago in Ecuador, it is evident the lack of investment in intelligence, counter surveillance, early warning, protective logistics and other advance protection measures that could have stopped these attacks before they happened, far from the victims in time and space.

For years, many in executive protection have followed the adage that "the unseen saint is not worshipped," inferring that a protection system must be colorful to be effective. However, there is no hard data or scientific fact to support this concept. On the contrary, over the past 123 years around the world, flashy protection has failed virtually every time it has been tested in real-world conditions, with tragic results. If we continue to invest only in showy operations focused on reacting at the last moment, we will continue to send our people to the slaughterhouse.

This deadly bias has caused, in Mexico alone and in the last 14 months, the death of 12 executives and 28 of their escorts, totaling 40 deaths in just over a year. This makes executive protection a highly deadly profession for both service providers and users, and all due to misconception and practice.

It is important to understand that simply placing any number of escorts on a follower vehicle with any type of weaponry is not effective and, in fact, may create a false sense of security. If the attacker is not deterred by the number of protectors and armament, as happened in this case and many others, the result will be fatal.

There is no doubt that, by repelling the attack by firing his weapon, the stakes were raised, since the risk of losing a material asset became the risk of being involved in a crossfire and endangering the life of the Chancellor. In the last six years, in Mexico, where this crime is much more frequent than in Chile, three protégés lost their lives in crossfire when their bodyguards tried to defend them from similar assaults. In the same period, three bodyguards were killed and four were wounded in the same circumstances.

When executive protection becomes lethal: The case of businessman David Gonzalez and the need to reformulate protection services.

By repelling the assault in this circumstance, the protector inevitably involves his protégé in a Russian roulette with great possibilities of losing his life, since, no matter how skilled the protector may be, there are always a number of factors beyond his control.

The focus of Executive Protection is to prevent an attack, not to wait to react, which has been the working philosophy of many members of the police or military assigned to this activity without specialized training.

Weeks later, the Ecuadorian police revealed that the victim had been followed for several days by a blue van posing as a vendor of water in jerry cans.

This vehicle followed the mayor everywhere, until the last day he was killed, constantly providing information and guiding the assassin.

This tragic incident once again reinforces the need to focus our efforts on counter-surveillance, rather than reacting only to attacks. Attackers must watch and analyze their victim for an extended period of time before acting, which provides a perfect opportunity to detect them and thwart the attack before it occurs.

4. "Seams" remain the most critical points in an executive protection operation and must be planned and performed with the utmost attention. The seams are the times when a person is most exposed to a high-risk environment, usually when exiting or before entering a vehicle. These are the scenarios where the vast majority of attacks occur. We have analyzed it in more detail in this video:

5. Armored vehicles are essential to reduce risks to executives. These units reduce risks in transfers and can provide shelter and evacuation at critical moments. One of the key factors that saved President Reagan's life during the 1980 assassination attempt was the presence of an armored vehicle.

6. If groups that endanger the executive are identified (as was the case), intelligence on these groups is critical to prevent the attack. This measure, and not the weapons, could have saved the candidate's life.

The deadly "Yes Pattern" methodology is based on three premises that are wholly or partially fallacious:

1. We are hired to make the executive's life easier.
2. He who pays the piper calls the tune. The executive will not accept suggestions, since he pays and what he wants is done.
3. We cannot change the executive's lifestyle.

These arguments would seem convincing if it were not for the disastrous results of their application. But let us analyze:

1. We are not hired to make executives' lives easier, but to manage and reduce their risks. While it is true that many of our activities as a "by product" make the executive's life easier, this is not our main objective. We are hired because a security study showed that the executive is vulnerable to certain risks, which he himself understands and accepts, and we are implementing the necessary measures to mitigate them. Otherwise, we would be called "executive hostesses" and not executive protection. However, it is true that many executive comfort activities that we can perform help reduce risks as we explain in this video:

but there are also many other activities of the same nature that can increase risks if carried out indiscriminately.

2. In executive protection, "he who pays the piper calls the tune" does not apply. Our profession is the activity where lives depend on the protectors in the same way that the lives of the passengers depend on the pilot of an airplane, and no passenger gives orders to the pilot on how to steer the aircraft, even though they paid for the ticket, or even if it were the owner of the airline himself.

3. No one is trying to change the lifestyle of executives, only to make the necessary logistical adjustments to manage their risks. These are two very different things. Here are some examples: businessman Adolfo Lagos was murdered in 2017 when his escorts were trying to defend him from an assault while riding his bicycle on a route with high rates of this crime. Changing his lifestyle would be to have told him to stop cycling. Suggesting a route with lower crime rates would be a logistical adjustment that reduces the risks only without affecting the lifestyle itself. Businessman Martin Rodriguez was murdered in 2021 as he left the gym. Changing the lifestyle would be to have told him to stop going to the gym. Suggesting other facilities that do not involve as much "sewing" would be a logistical adjustment only. (Of course, apparently in the latter case many other things would be required).

Although there are still many unknowns surrounding the case, some conclusions are evident:

- The implementation of armored vehicles is essential to significantly reduce risks in this type of operational circumstances.
- Basing executive protection solely on the deployment of armed escorts is deadly.
- Fence protection alone is totally ineffective.
- Counter surveillance and early warning are essential to reduce risks and save lives.

The ineffectiveness of the obsolete and obsolete convoys, these "operational dinosaurs" of the 1960s, has been demonstrated in numerous attacks in recent decades, and this incident at Frankfurt airport is further proof of their limitations in the absence of other operational elements.

In addition, counter-surveillance operations were conspicuous by their absence in this case, since if there had been a counter-surveillance team, the intruder would have been identified immediately. Finally, it would be redundant to comment on the last minute reaction failure of the close protection team, since, as statistics show, these groups historically fail virtually every time they are put to the test.